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External referencing and pharmaceutical price negotiation* 
Begoña Garcia Mariñosoa, Izabela Jelovacb, Pau Olivellac 
May, 2007 
Abstract 
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of 
identical products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates 
prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate 
independently or implement ER based on the foreign price. We show that country H 
always prefers ER if (i) it can condition ER on the drug being subsidized in the 
foreign country and (ii) copayments are higher in H than in F. H’s preference is 
reinforced when the difference between country copayments is large and/or H’s 
population is small. External referencing by H always harms F if (ii) holds, but less so 
if (i) holds. 
Keywords: Pharmaceuticals, external referencing, price negotiation. 
JEL codes: L65, I18. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at analyzing the incentives for a country to engage in external 
referencing for pharmaceuticals as opposed to directly negotiating the drug’s price 
with the firm. External referencing (ER) consists of a price cap for pharmaceuticals, 
based on prices of identical products in other countries. 
With very few exceptions, most countries in the industrialized world have 
implemented ER at some point of time. Indeed, the policy is commonly used by most 
European countries, where it is also usual that prices be determined by negotiations 
between government agencies and pharmaceutical firms.1 For instance, ER came into 
force in the Netherlands and in Switzerland in 1996, under the Pharmaceutical Prices 
Act and the Health Insurance Law, respectively. In the Netherlands, the maximum 
price for a drug is established as an average of the prices of the drug in Germany, 
France, UK, and Belgium. Prior to 1996, the prices for pharmaceuticals in the 
Netherlands were not subject to any regulation and they were high compared to the 
prices in those surrounding countries. As expected, the Pharmaceutical Prices Act 
resulted in considerably lower prices in general for the Netherlands (see Windmeijer 
et al., 2006). In Switzerland, the Health Insurance Law introduced a 'positive list' of 
reimbursed pharmaceuticals. For a drug to be included in this positive list, its price 
should not exceed the average of the prices in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the UK. 
Both the Dutch and the Swiss experiences raise the following questions: Why are 
these countries interested in engaging in ER rather than in any other type of cost-
containment regulation? Namely, given that pharmaceutical prices are directly 
negotiated upon in the UK for example, why does the Dutch health authority rely on 
these foreign prices rather than on prices specifically negotiated for the Netherlands? 
What is the influence of the ER policy on the reference countries? 
To tackle these questions, we use a model where a pharmaceutical firm (simply “the 
firm” henceforth) sells a drug in two countries. To focus on the role of consumer 
copayments and also to gather whether any country size effects exist we assume that 
                                                 
1 See Section 2 for a detailed account of the European experience. 
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countries differ both in size (namely, the number of consumers) and in the level of 
copayments. 
In our main contribution we assume that, in the absence of an ER policy, both 
countries negotiate the price with the firm and are unable to threaten the firm with not 
authorizing the drug for sale in case of negotiation failure. The only threat available to 
countries is that of not listing the drug for reimbursement, so that the firm can still sell 
the drug at any price of their choice, but with no subsidy. This assumption is 
motivated by the fact that in Europe negotiating agencies have no role in the 
authorization of the drug. We therefore say that in Europe we are in a “weak threats” 
scenario. Considering such a scenario, we analyze how the commitment by a country 
to engage in ER affects negotiations in a foreign reference country and ultimately 
determines the firm’s total profit.  
Our results with independent negotiations in each country are a direct corollary of 
Jelovac (2003), where she shows that with independent negotiations, prices are lower 
where subsidies are higher.2 Since a more generous subsidy results in a smaller 
negotiated price, there is scope for a country to engage in ER if its copayments are 
larger than the other’s. Hence, our contribution is the characterization of the effect of 
ER in this setting. To set some terminology, we refer to the country that would have 
an incentive to engage in ER as the “home” country. We refer to the country whose 
price serves as reference for the ER policy as “foreign country”. 
We show that the effects of an ER policy crucially depend on its specific design. In 
this respect, we distinguish between non-conditional and conditional ER policies. In a 
non-conditional ER policy, the price in the foreign country is used as a price cap 
regardless of whether it was the result of successful negotiations in the foreign 
country or chosen by the firm once negotiations had failed. In contrast, under a 
conditional ER policy, the foreign price is used as a price cap only if it is the result of 
successful negotiations, i.e., only if the drug is included in the foreign country’s list of 
subsidized drugs.  
                                                 
2 This may seem counterintuitive, since in markets that use the price mechanism as an allocation device 
high subsidies are associated with demand inelasticity and high prices. However, with bargaining, high 
subsidies increase the gains from negotiation to firms, who are then willing to bear lower prices. 
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The main results of the paper are the following. First, an unconditional ER policy 
harms both countries and should never be implemented. The reason is that the firm 
will find it optimal to force a very high foreign price even if this forces negotiation 
failure in the foreign country. Let us now consider conditional ER. Our second result 
is that, with weak threats, an ER policy increases the negotiated foreign price. This 
harms the foreign country. Yet, the home country prefers conditional ER to an 
independent price negotiation. However, this preference diminishes as the relative 
population size grows in the home country, although it never disappears. Finally, as 
compared to the profits resulting from independent price negotiations, ER brings an 
increase in profits in the foreign country and a decrease in the home country. 
Moreover, the second effect is strong enough so that overall profits decrease. 
We also consider two extensions of our model to check the robustness of our results. 
First, suppose that health agencies are able to threaten with a ban on the drug. That is, 
agencies are able to condition drug authorization on negotiation success. We refer to 
this as the “tough-threats” scenario. We show that our main insight - the home country 
is benefited while the firm is harmed by conditional ER – still holds. However, in 
contrast to the weak threats scenario, ER does not harm the foreign country as the 
negotiated price in the foreign country is unaffected by the home country’s ER.  
Returning to the weak threats scenario, the second extension considers the possibility 
that the firm offers a transfer to the foreign country in exchange for a high price. We 
show that, if these transfers are observable to the home country and if the agency in 
the home country can ex-ante threaten to delist the drug upon this observation then the 
firm will never find it profitable to engage in such transfers.  
Let us offer some intuition for our main results. Under weak threats, we find that the 
ER policy worsens the bargaining power of the foreign country vis à vis the firm, 
thereby increasing the foreign price. The mechanism is as follows. The firm’s threat 
point in the bargaining with the foreign agency improves when an ER policy is 
implemented. By how much depends on the way the home country designs its ER 
policy. As an illustration, consider the extreme case where the ER is un-conditional. 
As explained above, the firm can exploit the home country’s promise that it will 
“copy” the foreign price no matter what. Namely, the firm lets negotiations in the 
foreign country break down by demanding a very high price, in order to maximize the 
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profits accrued in the home country, where demand is inelastic due to the subsidy. 
This effect is also present (although in a smaller scale) under conditional ER with 
weak threats. Indeed, the only situation where the effect does not exist is in the tough-
threats scenario. In this scenario, a negotiation failure in the foreign country implies 
that the firm looses home country’s market altogether.  
Let us return to the possibility that the firm is able to make transfers to the foreign 
agency in exchange for higher prices. Here, results depend on whether transfers are 
observable to the home agency. If they are not, then the situation is equivalent to an 
unconditional ER. Namely, the firm can induce a large price in both countries. The 
only difference with unconditional ER is that the foreign agency is not forced now to 
delist the pharmaceutical drug. In contrast, if transfers are observable (and the home 
country has strong incentives to monitor), the home country can commit ex-ante to 
delist the drug upon observation of such transfers. This is consistent with the weak 
threats assumption: under a conditional ER, the drug is delisted in the home country 
upon observation of a negotiation failure in the foreign country. As advanced above, 
the threat of delisting is enough to discourage such transfers from the firm. We have 
no systematic information on how referencing countries respond to transfers of this 
kind. We do however observe them. For instance, Pfizer offered disease management 
services to state residents in the state of Florida in order to avoid a low price that 
would be a benchmark for other states.3 
Another contribution of our paper is that it enlightens (i) the connections between ER 
and parallel imports (PI), and (ii) the connections between ER and most favored 
nation (MFN) clauses.4 As for (i), the closest paper to ours is Pecorino (2002), who 
studies the effects of parallel imports from the foreign to the home country.5 He 
obtains that, surprisingly, the presence of PI results in higher profits for the firm. It 
turns out that our model with unconditional ER yields the same result, as it constitutes 
a different version of Pecorino’s, namely one with subsidies (which he assumes 
                                                 
3 “Florida-Pfizer deal charts new territory in overall cost control, but can it work?” Formulary 
September 1, 2001. We thank the Editor for suggesting this real-world case. 
4 We thank a referee for pointing this connection to us. 
5 Notice the parallelism in our terminology here: the country engaging in PI/ER is referred to as the 
home country. 
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away).6 Hence the statement made by Danzon et al. (1997) that ER is tantamount to a 
100% parallel import is confirmed for the case of an unconditional ER policy. In 
contrast, if ER is conditional, Pecorino’s result is reversed: the firm’s profit decreases 
with ER. 
It is useful to discuss the differences and similarities between Pecorino’s results and 
ours in more detail. First, both ER and PI imply a stronger implicit negotiation power 
for the firm (the disagreement payoff of the firm is higher when two countries rather 
than one are concerned by the negotiation). This increases the firm’s profits accrued 
in the foreign country in the same way under PI as under ER. Second, with PI the firm 
looses some of the profits accrued in the home country, also as under conditional ER. 
However, this reduction in profits is larger under conditional ER than under PI. In 
fact, it is so much larger, that the sum of profits in all countries falls under ER as 
opposed to the result with PI.  
This difference is not due to the inherent disparity between PI and ER but to the 
different benchmarks considered in each paper. In Pecorino’s, in the absence of PI the 
firm sets the monopoly price in the unregulated home country. By allowing PI, the 
price in the home country falls, and this causes a second order decrease on firm’s 
profits, since the change in price starts from a profit maximizing price (the monopoly 
price).7  We instead assume that the benchmark is one where the firm is negotiating 
the price in both countries. Thus, the benchmark prices considered are not profit 
maximizing, and the change in profits that is triggered by ER is not second order.  It 
turns out that, with conditional ER, the fall in profits in the home country dominates.  
The idea is that, since ER is conditional, the firm looses the subsidy in both countries 
if negotiations in the foreign country fail, which weakens the firm’s bargaining 
position. 
To sum up, the differences between our results and Pecorino’s reflect the context 
considered. Whilst Pecorino addresses the situation in the US, where pricing is 
                                                 
6 Actually, the benefits to the firm under unconditional ER are so high that the home country has no 
interest in adopting ER. 
7 This is noted by Pecorino, see page 707. 
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usually free of regulation, we concentrate on European countries where prices are 
usually negotiated.  
As mentioned above, one can also draw some parallelisms between ER and MFN 
clauses. Indeed, a MFN clause forces the seller to charge the same price (the lowest 
price) to all the buyers, which is essentially what ER does. For example, Cooper and 
Fries (1991, CF henceforth) consider a monopolist who bargains with two buyers over 
a selling price, and they also use Nash bargaining. It is not surprising that some of 
their results are common to ours. To be more specific, under both policies, there is a 
country that decides on implementing the policy whereas the other country is affected 
by the policy. It is a common result under both policies that the affected country 
looses whereas the country that implements the policy wins with respect to the status 
quo (independent price negotiations). In contrast, ER and MFN clauses affect the firm 
in different ways. In CF the firm gains by the MFN whereas the firm looses with 
conditional ER. The reason is quite simple.  CF assume that, for the MFN clause to be 
viable, the country that implements the policy and the firm must agree on the MFN 
clause. Hence, in CF the authors provide sufficient conditions ensuring that both this 
country and the firm are better off through the MFN clause. In sharp contrast, we 
assume that whether the ER policy is established or not is solely the country’s choice. 
One may then wonder why the firm never benefits from conditional ER. The reason is 
that, with conditional ER, the firm is delisted from subsidization if negotiations fail in 
the affected country, which tends to reduce the firm’s negotiation power vis à vis this 
country. If instead ER was unconditional, then the firm would benefit from ER, as in 
CF.  
Unfortunately, a limitation to our study is that there is very scarce information about 
the details of existing ER policies. For example, we do not know whether these 
policies are conditional or unconditional, or whether their details are far more 
sophisticated than the ones we have described above. After all, an ER policy is an ex-
ante commitment device and it could be made to depend on the complex flux of 
events it precedes. However, we believe that by focusing on the three examples that 
we have picked (unconditional ER, conditional ER with weak threats, and conditional 
ER with tough threats) we can gather the direction of the effects and demonstrate how 
important the design of the policy is. 
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The paper is organized as follows. A description of the European experience with ER 
is provided in Section 2. A two-country model with fixed-charge copayments is 
described in Section 3. Section 4 provides the solution to the benchmark case in which 
each country negotiates the price with the pharmaceutical firm, independently of the 
other country. Section 5 introduces the possibility that one country adopt a weak-
threats ER policy, and analyzes its effects. We distinguish between unconditional ER 
(Subsection 5.1) and conditional ER (Subsection 5.2). Section 6 extends the analysis 
by considering transfers and section 7 extends the analysis to the tough-threats case. 
Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix. 
2. The European Experience 
Let us now overview the many instances of ER that one can find in Europe.8 These 
cases motivate our assumptions, namely, that countries negotiate prices and that 
threats are weak. In other words, countries cannot threaten to not authorize drugs for 
sale if price negotiations fail.  
Countries using ER and countries used as reference countries 
Many countries in Europe have implemented ER. However, not only the details differ 
from country to country, but are also changed often. For instance, in Denmark, foreign 
prices were used to determine the reimbursement price for drugs with same ATC-
code, but this policy has been discontinued recently, and has been replaced by non-
price controls. In Sweden, ER was discontinued in 2002. Hence, the situation is, to 
say the least, volatile and the examples given below are only valid as of the time of 
writing this section. 
The ER formula 
As for inter-country differences, some administrations use the prices of other 
countries to construct an average reference price, whereas others take the minimum 
price. Among the first ones, some use a large list of referenced foreign countries. 
                                                 
8There are countries outside Europe that also have implemented ER: Brazil (lowest price); Canada 
(median price); Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (average price). 
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Austria uses prices from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Finland adds, to the previous list, 
prices from Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway. Also among countries using 
average prices, others use prices from just a handful of countries. This is what 
happens in the two examples presented in the introduction (the Netherlands and 
Switzerland). There are many other countries that take averages of country prices: 
Austria, Belgium, Italy, Lithuania take average prices minus 5% and Norway takes an 
average of the lowest 3 prices of the countries it considers. 
As mentioned, some countries take the minimum instead of the average price. France 
uses the lowest price among Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. Other countries using 
the same method are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, ex-Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
In summary, out of all European Countries, only UK, Sweden, Germany, and 
Denmark do not currently have an ER policy. 
Weak versus tough threats 
Also importantly for our model, there are reasons to believe that most European 
experiences correspond to the weak threats scenario. The reason is simple. In Europe, 
authorization and price negotiation are separate processes carried out by independent 
agencies, based on different criteria, and with different time horizons.  As Heuer et al. 
(2007) point out, “[W]ith the introduction of the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency (EMEA) in 1995, the EU Member States wanted to harmonize access to the 
pharmaceutical market” so that “[...] companies benefit from a larger market after 
authorization.” (p. 2). As for Switzerland, a non-EU state, Paris and Docteur (2007) 
report that “to be launched on the Swiss market, pharmaceutical products have to be 
approved by the Swissmedic [...]. The institute grants a marketing authorization if the 
product meets the requirements of quality, safety and effectiveness. The clinical 
assessment is based on data provided by the pharmaceutical company. This 
authorization is valid for 5 years.” In contrast, “The Federal Office of Public Health 
(OFSP) regulates both inclusion in the positive list and pricing of reimbursed 
pharmaceuticals.” On the other hand, outside Europe, Brazil and Canada are known to 
10 
threaten with not authorizing drug sales if negotiation fails or if the firm does not 
accept ER. 
Empirical measures of the effects of ER 
Apart from the work by Windmeijer et al. (2006) mentioned in the introduction, there 
are several empirical studies that analyze the impact of price regulation. 
Unfortunately, more than exploring the effects of ER in isolation, most empirical 
studies aim to determining the effect of price controls in general.9 An exception is 
Heuer et al (2007), who explore whether countries engaging in ER suffer from delays 
in the launch of pharmaceutical products. Although we do not address this 
phenomenon, we think that it is a good proxy for the importance of ER. Although the 
authors explore several explanatory variables (therapeutic value, cost-effectiveness, 
and so on), it is suggestive that the dummy variable for the presence of ER is 
significant at the 5% level.10  
Relative market sizes 
An important result is that under conditional ER and under weak threats, the home 
country’s preference for ER over independent negotiations diminishes as the foreign 
country’s size grows, although it never disappears. In terms of the European 
experience, recall that the Netherlands uses an average of the prices in Belgium, 
France, Germany, and UK. If we divide pharmaceutical sales in the Netherlands in 
2001 by pharmaceutical sales in each of these countries,11 we obtain, respectively, 
1.20, 0.18, 0.16, and 0.25. If we take the unweighted average of these numbers we 
obtain 0.45. If we performed the same calculation assuming that Germany was to use 
the same list of countries as benchmarks (adding the Netherlands and taking away 
                                                 
9 On the effects of regulation on price see Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b) and Cabrales and Jimenez  
(2007). On the effects of regulation and price differentials on launch delays see Danzon, Wang and 
Wang (2005) and Kyle (2007). 
10 More specifically, they show that, all else equal, if a country abolished the use of ER then the chance 
of launch within eight months would rise by 50.9%. 
11 Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2007, July 07. 
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Germany), we would obtain 4.09. The fact that Germany does not engage in ER while 
the Netherlands does is not incompatible with our result.12 
3. The Model 
The players in this game are a pharmaceutical firm and the health authorities of two 
countries, H (home country) and F (foreign country). We refer to these players as the 
firm and the agencies. The firm sells a drug in both countries. It holds a patent for the 
drug in both countries and produces at no variable cost.13 
Both agencies operate a positive list of reimbursed pharmaceuticals. If the drug is 
listed for reimbursement in country i, patients pay a fixed and exogenous copayment 
iC , as long as price is above copayment. If the price is below the copayment we 
assume that the out-of-pocket payment Zi, i = F, H, is the price itself (no taxes). 
Formally, 
{ }iii PCMinZ ,= , i = F, H. 
The difference between the price and the copayment ii CP − , if positive, is reimbursed 
by the agency to the firm. If the drug is not listed for reimbursement then the patients 
pay the full price of the drug, iP .  
We assume that aggregate demand in country F is given by )( FZD , with 0)(' <FZD , 
0)('' ≤FZD . Note that by assuming that copayments are fixed, demand is 
independent of the price as long as the price is above the copayment. Country H is a 
K-replica of country F, with K > 0 but not necessarily larger than one. We say that 
country H has size K while country F has size 1. Aggregate demand in country H is 
KD(ZH). We denote by PM the monopoly price. In other words, PM maximizes 
)(PPD . Notice that PM is the same for both countries (and therefore independent of 
country size) due to two assumptions: zero variable costs (and in general due to 
                                                 
12 We can repeat a similar exercise using Gross Domestic Product at current prices in the 2nd quarter of 
2006 (source: Eurostat), which is the most recent quarter for which we have a complete set of data.  We 
obtain 0.63 (instead of 0.45) and 3.58 (instead of 4.09). 
13 The assumption that variable costs are negligible can be sustained empirically. Moreover, our 
analysis can be extended to situations with constant returns to scale. Having a positive marginal cost 
would only involve more complicated calculations, while in essence the results would be the same. 
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constant returns to scale gross of sunk costs), and country H being a K-replica of 
country F.  
The following assumption reflects another asymmetry between the two countries.  
Assumption 1. If the drug is listed for reimbursement in both countries, patients pay 
less in country F than in country H, and they pay less than the monopoly price, PM, in 
both countries. In other words, MHF PCC << .  
As we will see, H would never implement ER if HF CC > . If Mi PC > for some 
country i, the drug subsidization system would vanish in that country. 
Notice that F and H have different aggregate demands for two reasons. One is country 
size. The other is that, if country prices are larger than copayments, even if an 
individual in F has the same demand function as another in H and even if factory 
prices are the same in the two countries, the latter individual will demand less due to 
the higher copayment. 
The pharmaceutical firm aims at maximizing its joint profit from both countries, with 
)( FF ZDP  being profit in country F and )( HH ZKDP  being profit in country H. 
We assume that, in each country i, copayments are exogenously set beforehand by 
some outside player (say the Government or the Parliament of this country). Hence 
we do not aim at studying what the optimal copayment Ci should be. This depends on 
the outside players’ preferences, whether the firm is owned by nationals or foreigners, 
equity and insurance considerations, consumption externalities, etc. The agency only 
bargains for low prices with firms in return for reimbursement rights. We believe this 
encompasses most real world cases.14 
We assume that the agency is given the following mandate by the outside player: She 
should negotiate prices with the firm in order to maximize net consumer surplus 
minus the public costs of provision. Hence, the agency’s objective function does not 
                                                 
14 Some countries rely on the so-called “tiered pricing” whereby lower prices result in the drug 
enjoying a higher subsidy. Our model amounts to a very simple tiered pricing mechanism. As it will be 
explained below, negotiation failure results in the drug not being listed for subsidization. Hence, only 
two tiers are present: a subsidy P − Ci or no subsidy at all. 
13 
include the profits of the firm. We believe this assumption also to be in accordance 
with reality, especially in countries with no pharmaceutical industry. A motivation 
might be that the outside player finds it beneficial to delegate the bargaining over 
price to a more aggressive negotiator.  
Now, in a market of size Ki, with Ki = { }K,1 , we define the net consumer surplus as:  
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅−= ∫ − )()()(
)(
0
1
ii
ZD
iii ZDZdqqDKZCSK
i
.15 
The objective function of the agency of a country of size Ki is: 
)()()( iiiiii ZDZPKZCSK ⋅−− .16 
We model the negotiation process as a Nash bargaining game. We assume that the 
scenario is one with weak-threats. Namely, we assume that if negotiations fail in a 
country, the drug is not listed for reimbursement but the firm is allowed to market the 
product in that country. Of course, the firm will do so at the monopoly price, MP . If 
the drug is not listed for reimbursement, there are no public expenses associated with 
subsidizing the drug and the objective function of the government reduces to 
Ki )( MPCS , the value of the net consumer surplus at the monopoly price.  
The following lemma will be useful later on. Consider the following function: 
)()()( PCSPPDPW += . This function reflects the sum of (per capita) consumer and 
producer surplus in the absence of subsidy. Then: 
Lemma 1. The function W is concave and attains a maximum at P = 0. 
                                                 
15 We consider the consumer surplus as a measure of health benefits as it is linked to the willingness to 
pay for the drug.  
16 Notice that, if Pi < Ci then Zi = Pi and the objective function becomes Ki.CS(Pi). Notice also that, if 
Pi > Ci then Zi = Ci and the objective function of the agency is decreasing in Ci. Although, as explained 
above, we take copayments as exogenously set beforehand, it is useful to understand why this is so. 
Suppose that one increases the copayment so that demand is reduced by one unit. This has a negative 
effect on gross consumer surplus equal to the original copayment, as the unit that is no longer sold was 
enjoyed by the marginal consumer. However, it also has a positive effect, as total expenditures 
(consumer plus government’s) are reduced by the price. Since our premise was that copayment was 
below price, the assumed objective function increases. In consequence, if the agency was in charge of 
setting copayments, drug consumption would not be subsidized. However, also as explained above, the 
outside player’s preferences may be quite different from those of the agency. 
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This lemma is very intuitive. Since marginal cost is assumed to be zero, the price that 
would maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus is also zero. 
Finally, the agencies of both countries have the same bargaining power, denoted by β . 
The bargaining power of the firm in either country is β−1 . 
Throughout the text we denote )( MM PDD = , )( MM PCSCS =  and MMM DP=π . 
We also denote )( ii CDD = , )( ii CDD ′=′ , )( ii CCSCS =  and )( ii CSCSC ′=′  for i = F, 
H. 
4. Independent Price Negotiations 
Here we present our main benchmark case in which each country carries a price 
negotiation with the pharmaceutical firm, independently from the other country, and 
in the scenario with weak threats.17  Therefore, Mi CSK ⋅  and MiK π  constitute the 
disagreement payoffs of the agency and the firm, respectively.  
The Nash bargaining problem for a country i of size Ki = { }K,1  is: 
Maximize 
ip
 
{ } { }
[ ] ])(ln[)1(])()()(ln[ln
])([ln)1(])()()([ln1
M
ii
M
iiiii
M
iii
M
iiiiii
ZDPCSZDZPZCSK
ZDPKCSZDZPZCSKNB
πββ
πββ
−−+−−−+=
−−+−−−=
 
subject to: { }iii PCMinZ ,=         (1) 
It is worth noting that in the bargaining problem of any country, we assume that the 
agency places no value on the consumer surplus or the public expenses of the other 
country. Note also that the size of the country, Ki, only constitutes a level effect in this 
bargaining problem, and in consequence will not affect the final price. By solving (1) 
we obtain the following lemma. 
                                                 
17 This analysis heavily draws from Jelovac (2003). 
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Lemma 2. When both countries independently negotiate the price with the firm, then 
(i) the resulting price in each country i, i = F, H is: 
i
M
i
M
i
ii DD
CSCSCP πβββ +−−+−= )1()1(* ,     (2) 
(ii) This price is increasing in the level of copayment, Ci and decreasing in β, and 
(iii) ii CP >*  for all i = F, H. 
The profits per capita in the bargaining solution in country i are:  
MM
iiiiii CSCSDCDP βπββπ +−−+−== ])[1()1(**  
 Note that these profits decrease in Ci, since: 0´)1(/* <−=∂∂ iiii DCC βπ . Since 
HF CC <  by Assumption 1, profits per capita are larger in country F.  
Note that Part (i) of Lemma 2 implies the following equality:  
[ ] [ ]MiiiMi DPDCPCSCS πββ −=−−−− ** )()1( .     (3) 
Equation (3) illustrates that the surplus generated by the negotiation above the 
disagreement point is split between the country and the firm in the proportion β to 
1−β, as usual in this type of problem. 
In the bargaining problem, the disagreement point does not depend on the copayment 
C i. Hence, the effect of the copayment on the negotiated price is only due to its effect 
on the surplus generated by the negotiation above the disagreement point. Let )( iCS  
denote this surplus, with: 
MM
iiii CSDCCSCS π−−+=)( .      (4) 
Note that S(Ci) is decreasing in iC : 0)( <′=′++′=′ iiiiiii DCDCDSCCS . 
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As the copayment increases, there is less to be split between the two parties and the 
negotiated solution converges to the monopoly outcome. The public costs of the 
subsidy decrease, and the agency can afford higher negotiated prices. At the same 
time, as the copayment increases, there is less for the firm to gain by negotiating and 
hence it requires a larger price. This explains Lemma 2. The next is a direct corollary. 
Corollary 3. For any Ki and with independent negotiations, the negotiated price in 
the country with a large copayment exceeds the negotiated price in the country with a 
small copayment: ** HF PP < . 
Therefore, we focus on the situation where the foreign country F is the reference 
country for the home country H. 
5. The types of external referencing in the weak-threats scenario 
In this section we consider the effects of an ER policy by H based on the price of 
country F. Our aim is to explain how H’s ER affects the bargaining outcome in 
country F and to investigate whether it is in the interest of H to implement this policy. 
As explained in the introduction, an ER policy may take many different forms. In 
particular we must settle first how the price cap is defined. Is it any price in country 
F? Or is it the price in F as long as it results from successful negotiations? In the first 
case we say that the ER policy is unconditional, in the second case we say that the ER 
policy is conditional. If ER is conditional, we must specify what happens in the case 
of failed negotiations in F. As we are under the weak-threat scenario, we assume that 
if negotiations in country F fail, H ceases to reimburse the drug but still allows the 
firm to sell the drug at a full price chosen by the firm. Similarly, we assume that, if the 
firm decides not to respect the ER policy and sells the drug in country H at a price 
higher than the price cap, H ceases to reimburse the drug but still allows the firm to 
sell the drug at any price chosen by the firm. 
The following table summarizes the types of ER that we analyze by showing, for each 
type, both the price paid by patients and the price received by the firm. It also 
describes the tough threat case, anticipating one of the extensions at the end of the 
paper. 
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Table 1: The types of ER by agency H 
(patients’ price, firm’s price) Unconditional ER with 
weak threats 
Conditional ER with 
weak threats 
ER with tough 
threats 
Negotiations in F succeed; 
Firm accepts ER 
(CF, PF) in F 
(CH, PF) in H 
Negotiations in F succeed; 
Firm rejects ER 
(CF, PF) in F 
(PH, PH) in H 
(CF, PF) in F 
No sales in H 
Negotiations in F fail; 
Firm accepts ER, if proposed 
Product delisted in F only: 
(PF, PF) in F 
(CH, PF) in H 
Negotiations in F fail; 
Firm rejects ER, if proposed 
Product delisted in both 
countries: (PF, PF) in F 
(PH, PH) in H 
ER not proposed, 
product delisted in 
both countries : 
(PF, PF) in F 
(PH, PH) in H 
 
No sales in 
either country
 
5.1 The effects of an unconditional ER policy 
An unconditional ER policy requires the least information on the part of H. It is the 
only feasible policy if H is unable to verify whether the negotiation in F has been 
successful (or, equivalently, whether the drug is on F’s positive list). In this case, if 
negotiations fail in country F, the firm is allowed to set a price P  that maximizes 
)}0),({( BKDPDMaxP +⋅ . Note that this problem is unbounded, as the demand in 
country H is fixed. Hence, there is no surplus associated to the bargaining problem. In 
consequence, negotiations fail.18 This illustrates, in a very extreme way, what is the 
problem with ER: It increases the disagreement payoff of the firm as compared to the 
disagreement payoff under independent negotiations (πΜ). In this case the increase is 
in fact unbounded. 
To sum up, an unconditional price cap with fixed copayments results in a very adverse 
outcome for both the home and foreign country. In fact, this negative result motivates 
our research, as it is telling us that ER must have more to it than the mere “copying” 
of other countries’ prices. Either more sophisticated policies should be in place 
(normative approach) or are in place despite not being actually observed because 
negotiations always succeed (positive approach). For this reason we turn our attention 
to conditional ER. 
                                                 
18 If an exogenous bound exists on the payments that country H can make, then we have to qualify our 
previous statement on negotiation failure. It only holds if the exogenous bound is large enough. If it is 
not, we would run into some convoluted casuistics that lie beyond the point we want to make, namely, 
the extreme adverse effects of an unconditional ER on bargaining. 
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5.2 The effects of a conditional ER policy 
If the negotiations in country F fail, the firm sells the drug with no subsidy in both 
countries. The disagreement payoffs of F’s agency and the firm become, respectively,  
MCS  and MK π)1( + . By backward induction, assume that P has been set in country F 
after successful negotiations. Then ER in H implies that the price offer made by the 
agency in H to the firm is P. This offer is accepted by the firm if and only if 
M
HCPMinDP Π≥}),{( . 
Otherwise, the firm prefers to reject ER even at the cost of selling an unsubsidized 
drug in H. This restriction leads to the following lemma. 
Lemma 4. To be acceptable to the firm in H, P must be strictly larger than CH. 
Once P > CH, we know that HHH DCDCPMinD == )(}),{( . Let us therefore define 
PMIN = H
M DΠ  as the minimum acceptable price by the firm. The next lemma 
further characterizes this price. 
Lemma 5. CH < PMIN < PM. 
As a consequence of Lemma 5, three separate intervals for P must be considered 
when F negotiates with the agency, since the formulae for negotiation payoffs are 
different in each interval. Namely, 
(i) P < CF < PMIN, where P is rejected by the firm in country H so consumers 
in H pay PM while consumers in F pay P; 19 
(ii) CF ≤ P ≤  PMIN, where P is still rejected by the firm so consumers in H pay 
PM while consumers in F pay CF; 
(iii) CH < PMIN ≤  P, where P is accepted by the firm in country H and 
consumers in F pay CF while consumers in H pay CH. 
                                                 
19 We must consider P < CF because part (iii) of Lemma 2 was derived under independent price 
negotiations, so the lemma does not directly apply once B engages in ER. 
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We now provide sufficient conditions ensuring that the Nash bargaining solution 
(hereafter NBS) in F yields P ≥  PMIN. We do this in two lemmas. 
Lemma 6. The NBS solution in F cannot yield P < CF.  
Lemma 7. There exists a function ),(~~ HF CCββ =  such that, for all ),(~ HF CCββ < , 
if we restrict P to be in ],[ MINF PC  then the NBS yields 
MINPP = . The function 
),(~ HF CCβ  is smaller than 1 and is decreasing in CH. 
Let us explain the condition ),(~ HF CCββ < . This condition guarantees that the Nash 
bargaining function reaches a maximum at PMIN if we restrict attention to P ≤  PMIN . 
This allows us to also restrict attention to P ≥  PMIN  when solving the Nash bargaining 
problem, which greatly simplifies the analysis. If β was instead very large, then 
agency F’s negotiation power would be so high that the negotiated price in A might 
fall below PMIN and in this case the firm would reject ER. Notice that ),(~ HF CCββ <  
imposes some restrictions on the combination of parameters ),,( HF CCβ , and that it is 
independent on K.20 Finally, notice that by Lemma 4, we know that the resulting price 
P  is strictly above CH. 
The Nash bargaining solution in country F is therefore the solution to the following 
program: 
Maximize { }MINPP ≥  
{ } { }MFFMFFF KKDDPCSDCPCS πββ )1()(ln)1()(ln +−+−+−−− .   (5) 
By solving (5) we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 8. If ),(~ HF CCββ < , when the conditional ER is adopted in country H, the 
negotiated price in country F is: 
                                                 
20 We provide a numerical example at the end of this section. 
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HF
M
F
M
F
F
WC
KDD
K
D
CSCSCP +
++−−+−= πβββ )1()1()1( ,   (6) 
which is strictly greater than PMIN and is increasing in FC , HC  and K. 
Lemma 8 allows us to write the following equality: 
{ }MFFWCF
F
HF CSDCPCS
D
KDD −−−+− )()1( β  
{ }))1()( MHFWC KKDDP πβ +−+=        (7) 
Equation 7 illustrates that the total surplus generated by the negotiation above the 
disagreement point is split between country F and the firm in the ratio: 
)1()1(  to βββ −>+−
F
HF
D
KDD . 
This shows that the implicit negotiation power of the firm is higher when country H 
engages in a conditional ER as compared to independent negotiations.  
It is also interesting to analyze how changes in K affect the outcome of the negotiation 
in F on the face of ER. A raise in K affects the bargaining between F and the firm in 
two ways. First, the pie to be shared between both parties is larger. Hence there is an 
outwards shift in the frontier of the problem. Second, the firm has a stronger 
disagreement payoff whilst F’s disagreement payoff remains the same. The next 
proposition tells us the outcome of these two effects. 
Proposition 9. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that ),(~ HF CCββ < . Then: 
(i)  0* >− FWC PP  and this difference increases in K.  
(ii)  0* <− HWC PP . This difference decreases in K and converges to an asymptote 
as K tends to infinity. This asymptote decreases in the difference CH − CF. 
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Therefore, the difference between WCP  and *HP  decreases monotonically as CF 
tends to CH. 
Proposition 9 is illustrated in Figure 1. It implies that H prefers to commit to a 
conditional ER policy rather than to engage in independent price negotiations with the 
firm. It also implies that this preference diminishes as the size of country H increases 
and as copayments become more homogeneous, but it is always positive. However, as 
a direct result of the adoption of ER in country H, the price negotiated in country F 
raises. This is explained by the change in the differences between failure and success 
payoffs of F and the firm. Moreover, as K increases the negotiated price in country F 
raises, but never to be so high that H loses out by choosing the ER policy rather than 
independently negotiating with the firm. Public expenses as well as the firm’s profit in 
country H are lower. The opposite holds in country F.  
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 Notice that consumers in either country are not affected by the ER policy since 
they pay a fixed copayment. The next proposition states that the total profits of the 
firm decrease because of the adoption of such an ER policy. 
Proposition 10. Under Assumptions 1 and ),(~ HF CCββ < , the total profits of the 
firm are lower when country H engages in ER, that is, 
HHFFHF
WC KDPDPKDDP **)( +<+ . 
Consequently, the sum of public expenses in both countries also decreases, implying 
that the decrease in H’s expenses compensates for the extra expenses in country F. 
This means that if country H wanted to fully compensate F for her “free riding”, she 
could do so and still achieve higher welfare than under independent negotiations.  
Numerical example 
We now present a numerical example to illustrate that the condition ),(~ HF CCββ <  
is not too restrictive and that it leaves enough room for ER to apply under a large set 
of parameter configurations. Let D(P) = 10 – P, so that PM = 5. The following figure 
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plots ),(~ HF CCβ  for different values of FC : { }4,3,2,1,0  < PM = 5. For each value of 
CF, any point (CH, β) lying below the corresponding curve is admissible.  
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
6. Extension to transfers from the firm to the foreign country 
We analyze here the possibility that the firm is able to make transfers to the agency in 
the foreign country in exchange for higher prices. We distinguish between the case 
where these transfers are not observable by country H and the case where they are 
observable. 
In the first case, the situation is equivalent to one of unconditional ER: the firm is able 
to induce a large price in both countries. The only difference with the unconditional 
ER situation is that the foreign country is now not forced to delist the pharmaceutical 
drug. 
In the second case, let us assume that, H delists the drug if a transfer is observed from 
the firm to country F. In this case the negotiations in F will be based on both the price 
P and the transfer T. The Nash Bargaining Problem becomes: 
{ }  0, >TPMaximize  
{ } { }MMFMFFF KKTPDCSTDCPCS ππββ )1(ln)1()(ln +−+−−+−+−−  
By letting τ = PDF − T and by canceling terms, this expression is equivalent to: 
{ }MΠ>τMaximize  
{ } { }MMFFF CSDCCS πτβτβ −−+−+− ln)1(ln . 
It is easy to see that this problem is the same as the independent negotiation problem 
(1) for country F: choosing P in problem (1) (with Ki = 1 and Ci = CF,) is tantamount 
to choosing τ  here, since both DF and T are constants. Hence, by accepting transfers, 
the agency in F is able to revert to an independent negotiations process. By part (i) of 
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Proposition 9, F prefers this to the ER outcome. Yet, the firm does not find it 
beneficial to engage in such transfers. First, using transfers decreases the firm’s profit 
in country F up to the value obtained with an independent negotiation, which is lower 
than that under ER (also by Proposition 9). Second, using transfers implies that the 
drug will be delisted in country H, leading to profits πM < πWC. Therefore, no transfers 
should be observed. 
7. Extension to tough-threats 
As explained in the introduction, our main motivation is to provide insights into the 
European markets, where price negotiations have no bearing on the drug authorization 
decision (i.e. only weak threats are feasible). However, it is interesting to see that our 
main results remain even when agencies in charge of price negotiation can also 
threaten with a ban on the drug. In this section we assume that agencies in countries F 
and H are able to make such tough threats.  
That is, with independent negotiations if the negotiation in a country fails, this 
country’s agency does not authorize the drug for sale. Similarly, if H implements a 
conditional ER policy, then if negotiations in country F fail, again H does not 
authorize the drug for sale. Notice that tough threats change the disagreement payoff 
of both the Nash bargaining problem under independent negotiations and the Nash 
bargaining problem in F when H engages in ER. 
Unfortunately, solving the model with tough threats at the same level of generality as 
the model with weak threats is quite complex. To illustrate this note that with tough 
threats and independent negotiations the disagreement point is no longer 
(CSΜ, πΜ), but (0,0). This means that it is difficult to rule out situations where price is 
so low that it falls below the copayment.  Hence the analysis needs to deal with the 
non-differentiability of the patients’ payment function. In contrast, in the weak threats 
scenario one can use the fact that profits must be above πΜ  to avoid this non-
differentiability. 
In order to derive some explicit results, we restrict attention to the linear demand case.  
More precisely, for α, ψ  > 0, let demand be given by 
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D(Z) = (α − Z)/ψ. 
 We also assume that CF = 0. This obviously guarantees that the price resulting from 
any negotiation taking place in country F is above the copayment in that country. This 
drastically reduces the number of cases and comparisons that one must address. Of 
course, we still assume that 0 =  CF < CH < PM = α/2,  in order to have an interesting 
problem. 
These assumptions allow us to derive a sufficient condition ensuring that: 
i) The price resulting from the Nash bargaining problem with ER by H is above CH. 
ii) The price resulting from the Nash bargaining problem when H conducts 
independent price negotiations with the firm is also above CH. 
iii) Agency H is able to decrease prices using ER. Thus, the main result that we 
obtained under weak threats is maintained. 
iv) In contrast to the weak threats scenario, under tough threats Country F is 
unaffected by ER. In other words, the negotiated price in F is the same irrespective of 
whether H engages in ER or not. 
v) As a direct result of (iii) and (iv), overall firm’s profits decrease with ER. 
Let us formalize these results.  
Proposition 11  There exists a function ),( HCKββ =  such that, for all 
β < ),( HCKβ , we have that  
  IPNHH
ERIPN
F PC PP =−+<−== 2
)1()(
2
)1( βαβα .  
The function ),( HCKβ  is decreasing in K and CH. Total firm’s profits are lower 
under ER. 
The intuition for Proposition 11 is similar to the one in the previous section. If health 
authorities’ bargaining power  was high, prices would tend to be low, which as 
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explained above, would require dealing with the fact that the consumer copayment 
function is non-differentiable at CH.21  
A feature of ER under tough threats is that the negotiated price becomes independent 
of K.  Intuitively, when the threat point is a sales ban in both countries, the size of the 
home country ceases –trivially– to influence the threat point. 
Finally, and as we did in subsection 5.2, we provide a numerical example that shows 
that the assumption β < ),( HCKβ is not too restrictive.  In Figure 3, we depict 
),( HCKβ  as a function of H’s country size K for CH  = 1, 2, 3, 4 and α = 10 (so that 
CH  < PM = 5).  
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE] 
8. Conclusions 
Using a model where two countries differ only in their population size and 
subsidization policies, our most general result is that a country has an incentive to 
engage in ER if its copayment levels are high as compared to the other country’s. This 
preference dwindles as the relative size of the country engaging in ER increases. We 
have analyzed how ER affects the negotiations in the foreign country of reference, F, 
proving that the design of the policy makes a substantial difference. One of the 
reasons for these differences is the fact that changing the design of the ER policy 
results in changes in the disagreement point in F’s bargaining problem. Instead, an ER 
policy always increases the surplus to be shared between F and the firm no matter its 
design. The idea is that the profits obtained by the firm in the home country, H, 
become part of the pie.  
                                                 
21 We must preclude prices from falling below CH in both the Nash bargaining program in H under IPN 
and in the Nash bargaining program in F when H engages in ER. This requires two upper bounds on 
β , one for each program. The more restrictive bound arises with ER. The reason for this is that, under 
ER, agency H free rides on the better bargaining position of F. 
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We have also examined which is the best policy for H. Clearly H should never adopt 
unconditional ER. That is, foreign prices should only be used as price caps if these 
drugs are included in the foreign positive list.  
With tough threats the firm suffers a harsher punishment in the case that negotiations 
fail. We show that if all countries are able to make tough threats the main result with 
weak threats turns out to be robust: ER benefits the home country and harms the firm.  
Finally, for the case of conditional ER with weak threats, we can provide a clear 
empirical prediction that hinges on the relative size of the home country. Perhaps 
surprisingly, it turns out that the relative size of the home country is irrelevant as to 
the sign of the advantage of ER over independent negotiations. It is always positive. 
Only the size of the advantage is affected. In other words, should ER have some 
external and fixed cost that we have not taken into account,22 then ER would only be 
implemented if the size of the home country is not too large. In a nut shell, only small 
countries should be observed to engage in ER and/or ER should be based on large 
countries (or a large group of countries). Our analysis yields an analogous prediction 
if one substitutes “large country” by “small copayment country” and vice versa. 
                                                 
22  For instance, some political cost. 
27 
References 
Cabrales, A. and S. Jimenez-Martin (2007), The Determinants of Pricing in 
Pharmaceuticals: Are U.S. Prices Really Higher than Those of Canada?, UFAE and 
IAE Working Papers 697.07. 
Cooper, T.E. and T.L. Fries (1991), The Most-Favored-Nation Pricing Policy and 
Negotiated Prices, International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, pp. 209-203. 
Danzon, P.M. (1997) Price Discrimination For Pharmaceuticals: Welfare Effects in 
the US and the EU, International Journal of the Economics of Business 4 (3), pp. 
1357-1516.  
Danzon, P.M. and L.W. Chao (2000a), Does Regulation Drive Out Competition in 
Phar-maceutical Markets, Journal of Law and Economics 43, pp. 311-357. 
Danzon, P.M. and L.W. Chao (2000b), Cross-national price differences for 
pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?, Journal of Health Economics 19, pp. 159-195. 
Danzon, P.M., Y.R. Wang and L. Wang (2005), The Impact of Price Regulation on 
the Launch Delay of New Drugs--Evidence from Twenty-Five Major Markets in the 
1990s, Health Economics 14 (3), pp. 269-92. 
Garcia Mariñoso, B. and P. Olivella (2005), Informational Spill-overs and the 
Sequential Launching of Pharmaceutical Drugs. Mimeo City University, London. 
Heuer, A., M. Mejer and J. Neuhaus (2007), The National Regulation of 
Pharmaceutical Markets and the Timing of New Drug Launches in Europe,  Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy Working Paper No. 437. 
Jelovac, I. (2003), On the Relationship between the Negotiated Price of 
Pharmaceuticals and the Patients’ Copayment, CREPP working paper 2002/04 
(Université de Liège). 
Kyle, M (2007), Price controls and entry strategy, Review of Economics and Statistics 
89, pp. 88-99. 
28 
Paris, V. and E. Docteur (2007), Pharmaceutical prices and reimbursement policies in 
Germany, OECD Health Working Papers, Paris. 
Pecorino, P. (2002), Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada?, 
Journal of Health Economics 21, pp. 699-708. 
Windmeijer, F., E. de Laat, R. Douven, and E. Mot (2006), Pharmaceutical Promotion 
and GP Prescription Behaviour, Health Economics 15 (1), pp. 5-18. 
29 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Since )()( PDPSC −=′ , differentiating W yields )(PDP ′ . Differentiating once again 
yields )()( PDPPD ′′+′ , which is negative. By setting the first derivative to zero, we 
obtain P = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Part (i) 
We first prove that P < Ci  is not feasible in the Nash Bargaining Problem in any 
country i = F, H: 
Notice that P D(P) < )( MMM PDP≡Π , since Mi PCP <<  and PM  maximizes P 
D(P). Hence, P D(P) is below the disagreement payoff for the firm for any P < Ci. 
Therefore, we can restrict attention to P ≥ Ci so that { } iiii CPCMinZ == ,  ,Ci} = Ci 
can be substituted into (1), which yields 
Maximize 
ip
 
[ ] ]ln[)1(])()(ln[ln1 MiiMiiiiii DPCSDCPCCSKNB πββ −−+−−−+=  
(A1) 
The first order condition associated to (A1) can be written as: 
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Rearranging this expression, equation (2) in Lemma 2 is obtained. This is the solution 
to (A1) since (A1) is concave in P: 
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∂
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Part (ii) 
To check that Pi* is increasing in Ci, rewrite the first-order condition associated to 
(A1) as: 
( ) ( ) 0)()1( ** =−−−−−− MiiMiiii DPCSDCPCS πββ . 
Applying the implicit function theorem to this expression, we obtain: 
ii
iiiiiii
i
i
DD
DPDCPDCS
C
P
ββ
ββ
−−−
′−⎥⎦
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⎡ ′−−+′−
−=∂
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i
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D
D β−−′−=
. 
This is positive, since equation (2) implies ii CP )1(
* β−> . 
Part (iii) 
To prove that Pi* is decreasing in β, take the derivative of Pi* with respect to β. Using 
(2), this yields:  
i
M
i
M
i
i
i
DD
CSCSCP Π+−−−=∂
∂
β
*
. 
This is negative if and only if iii
MM CSDCCS +<+Π . This is equivalent to W(PM) <  
W(Ci), which holds by Lemma 1 and Ci < PM. 
Part (iii) 
We now prove that ii CP >* , HFi ,=∀ . By definition, )(PDPM ⋅>π , MPP ≠∀ . 
Therefore, i
i
M
M
i CD
PC >⇒< π . Moreover, MiMi CSCSPC >⇒< . Therefore, 
ii CP >* , HFi ,=∀ . 
Proof of Corollary 3 
By part (ii) of Lemma 2 and HF CC < . 
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Proof of Lemma 4 
Suppose HCP ≤ . Then { } PPCMin H =,  and { } )(),( PPDPCMinPD H = . However, 
since PM maximizes )(PPD  and MH PC < , we have that 
{ } MMMH DPPPDPCMinPD Π≡<= )(),( , 
a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 5. 
On the one hand, since MH PC < , we have that DH > DM and we can write  
MIN
H
M
H
M
MM P
DD
DPP ≡Π≡> . 
On the other hand, since PM maximizes )(PPD , we have that HH
MM DCDP > . This 
implies that H
H
M
MIN C
D
P >Π≡ . 
Proof of Lemma 6. 
By Lemma 4, a price P < CF would be rejected by the firm in H. Therefore, if by 
contradiction this price solves the NBS in F, it would solve 
{ } { }MMM KKPPDCSPCSMax ππββ )1()(ln)1()(ln +−+−+− . 
This is equivalent to maximize 
{ } { }MM PPDCSPCSMax πββ −−+− )(ln)1()(ln . 
Notice that MMM DPPPD ≡Π<)( , since P < CF < PM and PM maximizes )(PPD , so 
)(PPD  is below the disagreement payoff of the firm for any P < CF, contradiction.  
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Proof of Lemma 7 
A first step is to show that 
F
M
F
F
F
M
D
CSCSC
D
−+<Π . To see this, rewrite the 
expression to get FFF
MM CSDCCS +<+Π . This inequality holds, as shown in the 
proof of Lemma 2 (part (ii)). The second step is to find P that solves 
Max { } { }MMFMFFF KKPDCSDCPCS ππββ )1(ln)1()(ln +−+−+−−− . 
This is equivalent to Max { } { }MFMFFF PDCSDCPCS πββ −−+−−− ln)1()(ln , which is 
the Nash bargaining problem in F under independent price negotiations, NB1F. We 
know that the solution is given by *FP , given in Lemma 2. In the proof of this lemma  
we showed that the objective function in the Nash bargaining problem under 
independent price negotiations is concave in P. Therefore, it suffices to show that 
there exists some parameter configuration under which MINF PP >* , so that the Nash 
bargaining program defined here reaches a maximum at MINP  when restricting the 
negotiated price to CF < P ≤ MINP . Comparing *FP  with 
MINP , we find that the 
inequality MINF PP >*  holds when 
),(~ HF
F
M
F
M
F
F
H
M
F
M
F
F
CC
DD
CSCSC
DD
CSCSC
ββ ≡Π−−+
Π−−+
< . 
Notice that 1),(~ =HF CCβ  when HF CC = , and ),(~ HF CCβ  is decreasing in HC . 
Therefore, 1),(~ <HF CCβ  when HF CC < . 
Proof of Lemma 8 
The first-order condition associated to the Nash bargaining program (5) can be written 
as: 
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=∂
∂
**
2
PP
NB
M
FF
WC
F
F
CSDCPCS
D
−−−− )(β
M
HF
WC
HF
KKDDP
KDD
πβ )1()()1( +−+
+−+  0= . 
Rearranging this expression, equation (6) in Lemma 8 is obtained. This is the solution 
to (5) since (5) is concave in P: 
=∂
∂
2
2
2
P
NB −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−−
2
)( MFFF
F
CSDCPCS
Dβ
2
)1()(
)1( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−+
+− M
HF
HF
KKDDP
KDD
πβ < 0. 
Since we already proved that the Nash bargaining function is concave for P ≥ MINP , 
to show that WCP  is a global maximum it suffices to prove that (i) WCP  > MINP  and 
(2) that the Nash bargaining function is continuous at P = MINP .  Let us prove (i). 
From the proof of Lemma 7, we know that *FP  >
MINP  when ),(~ HF CCββ < . Let us 
now prove that WCP > *FP . Indeed, using Lemma 2 (for i = F) and Lemma 8, we can 
write  
**
)( FHFF
HFM
F
WC P
KDDD
DDKPP >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−+= πβ . 
Let us now prove (ii). This is by inspection by substituting P = PMIN  in 1NB  and 2NB .  
Differentiating WCP  with respect to CF and CF, we obtain, respectively: 
.
)(
)1(
)(
)(1)1( 22
HF
M
F
F
M
FFFF
F
WC
KDD
KD
D
CSCSDDSC
C
P
+
+′−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −′−′+−=∂
∂ πββ  
Using the fact that FF DSC −=′  we can simplify the expression to: 
,0
)(
)1(
)(
)1( 22 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
++−−′−=∂
∂
HF
M
F
M
F
F
F
WC
KDD
K
D
CSCSD
C
P πββ  
and 
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0
)(
)1(
2 >+
+′−=∂
∂
HF
M
H
H
WC
KDD
KDK
C
P πβ . 
Finally note that: 
0
)(
)(
2 >+
−=∂
∂
HF
HF
MWC
KDD
DD
K
P βπ . 
Proof of Proposition 9 
Part (i) 
In the proof of Lemma 8 we proved that PWC > *FP . Notice that  
0
)(
)( * >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−=∂
−∂
HFF
HFMF
WC
KDDD
DD
K
PP βπ . 
Part (ii) 
As K tends to infinity, PWC tends to: 
H
M
F
M
F
F
WC
DD
CSCSCP πβββ +−−+−= )1()1(lim . 
To compare WCPlim  with 
*
HP  as defined in Lemma 2, it is enough to notice that the 
auxiliary function f (Z) is increasing in Z, where: 
)(
)()(
ZD
CSZCSZZf
M−+= .  
Using CS’(Z) = −D(Z) and assuming that Z < PM, we have that: 
[ ]
[ ] .0)(
)()()( 2 >−′−=′ ZD
CSZCSZDZf
M
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This implies WCPlim  < 
*
HP , since CF < CH. Given that P
WC is increasing in K (see 
Lemma 8), PWC − *HP  < 0, K∀ . 
The fact that 0)( >′ Zf  also implies that the difference R = *HP  − WCPlim  decreases as 
CF tends to CH. Therefore, the difference between PWC and *HP  decreases 
monotonically as CF tends to CH. 
Proof of Proposition 10 
Define ).(),,( ** HF
WC
HHFFHF KDDPKDPDPKCC +−+=Δ  We need to prove that 
),,( KCC HFΔ > 0. Suppose first that K = 0. In this case WCF PP =*  and therefore 
( ) .0)0,,( * =−=Δ FWCFHF DPPCC  Hence it suffices to prove that K∂Δ∂ > 0. That is, we 
need: 
.0)()()( ** >∂
∂+−−=−∂
∂+−=∂
Δ∂
K
PKDDDPPDP
K
PKDDDP
K
WC
HFH
WC
HH
WC
WC
HFHH
 
Substituting WCP  from Lemma 8, *HP  from Lemma 2, and the formula of K
PWC
∂
∂  
derived in the proof of Lemma 8 we obtain: 
[ ] ,)()1(1)1()()`( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−+
+−+−−=∂
Δ∂
HF
HF
HF
HM
HFH KDD
DD
KDD
DKDCfCf
K
βπβ  
where f (Z) is as defined in the proof of Proposition 9. Notice that the second term in 
the last expression is zero. The expression in brackets in the first term is positive since  
0)( >′ Zf  as shown in the proof of Proposition 9. 
Proof of Proposition 11 
The proof of Proposition 11 is available upon request from the authors. It is similar to 
the proof of Propositions 9 and 10 and of the lemmas preceding those propositions. 
We limit ourselves to provide the exact formula of the function ),( HCKβ . To ease 
36 
presentation, we introduce two auxiliary functions. Let Γ = K( α − 2CH )2 + α2 . By 
inspection, Γ is increasing in K. Since CH  < PM = α/2, we have that 2CH < α. This 
implies that Γ  is increasing in α  and decreasing in CH .  Then, 
Γ
−+
Γ−=
H
H
H
H C
KC
C
CK α
α
β
21
2
1
),( .  
Notice that 1),( <HCKβ . One can also check that ),( HCKβ  > 0 and that it is 
decreasing in K and CH. 
  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparing independent price negotiations to weak-threats conditional ER as 
country H’s size (K) increases relative to country F’s. The value of R is derived in the 
Appendix (proof of Proposition 9). It decreases as CF  increases. 
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Figure 2. Admissible parameter configurations. 
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FIGURE 3 
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Figure 3. The maximum value for β  as a function of K for different values of CH  and 
α = 10. 
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